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CaseNo.20070068-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

RORY DEMBERT,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004). This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1
1. Did the trial court properly deem Defendant's untimely motion to
suppress his statements to police as waived under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to treat an untimely motion to
suppress evidence as waived, or to grant relief from such waiver, is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264,265-66 (Utah 1992).
1

Because the State believes Defendant's second issue is most logically
addressed first, the State has reversed the issues in its brief.

2. Was Defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for failing to
timely file the motion to suppress his statements to police?
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law/' reviewed for correctness.
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6,89 P.3d 162,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah R. Crim. P, 12 (relevant
text reproduced in the Addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges and Bindover. On July 18, 2006, Defendant was charged by
information with the aggravated assault of Angelo Pollock, a second degree
felony.

R. 1-3. After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound

Defendant over to stand trial. R. 31-32.
Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement to Police. On the morning of
trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to police. R. 100-01; R.
170: 7. In support of the motion, counsel for Defendant, Lisa Remal, relied on a
transcript of the police interview that she had "made for [her] own help/ 7 R. 170:
7. She provided the court and the prosecutor with a copy of it, but did not
introduce it into evidence. R. 170: 7-8. Nor did she introduce the police
department's audio/video recording of the interrogation. See R 170.
2

I Inferring to her transcript, Ms- Remal ar r
Smith secured Defendant's Miranda waiver, Defendant 'unequivocally ii t v oked his
u ngn r

:£

\ccr Portel. R. 170: 7 *" ~* claimed that after reading the

, - .-„\

;

riKu loiui cu^ut Defendnnt vhefher he "

[t ']

u ^ i i c b c ...w .;i response, U d d i ^ -4-"™^
rather than the we

J

-

uta ..

^~

u h / " which, she argued, meant "no, I don't wan 1
The prosecutor objected to the motion lo ^ ^ r r e s s , 3^cv;r * -* - *
\iv,,.-1 leiy ana u LUS waived under the Utah Rules ot C.

_d Procedure. R. 17 0:

III, I le iJicn 1; riefly respon..-..u ^ the merits by offering the court a copy of
D(-!.-'n<iir.»'c ^ >;:il.^

—-

_

t.;.iDeensecurt,4

L-V •

10. WhenMs.Rem.il mi uncivil tin H IVfiTidn i lui 1

<IIH,UI|^

remain silent, the prosecutor complained that l*

IMHn't

•.•[ F

ir?

0i

mi nkixJ lui- n^ltl in

accurate [Ms. Remal's] transcript is. R. 170:^. ^ " a s s u i

^rel^v -1 ^

but .. s ued that Defendant "ma[de] some ambiguous noises, .ili-huh, J I
i

r<

. . oric/s question as to whether he wished to answer

c"_* niestion

- 'n1 nstjI Ji I n I l i q u i d to the prosecutor's

waiver argument or otherwise offer .i ii.\ r«iust« jnslifying relief It"
See R. 170:10-13.

3

1 lie Idle tiling.

After a brief recess, the trial court denied the motion "on the basis of the
timeliness issue." R. 170: 13-14. The court explained that under rule 12, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, motions to suppress must "be brought no later than
five days prior to trial, or they're deemed waived." R. 170:14. The court then
commented, "for edification of the Counsel," that "if [it] were to address the
merits," it "would rule that the motion ought to be denied" because Lieutenant
Smith's subsequent discussion with Defendant "was in effort to clarify
[Defendant's] rights under the Miranda warning." R. 170:14.
Conviction and Appeal. Defendant was thereafter tried and convicted by a
jury as charged; he was sentenced to a prison term of one-to-fifteen years. R. 8283,114-15,143,147-48,170-71. Defendant timely appealed. R. 157-58. Because
the full audio/video recording of Defendant's interrogation at the police station
was not introduced into evidence below, the parties filed with the Court a
Stipulation of facts "as they relate to Defendant's claim that his attorney at trial
provided ineffective assistance of counsel." Stipulation, filed November 12,2008.
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' STATEMENT O F F A PTS 2
In ti LV w e,
han^ii \b v •

..

w

* ^ of July 16,2006, Angel-»«

!i|

I u. k and his friend Tony were

tc K. v.a Home, a homeless shelter on Rio Grande Street in Salt

LakeCitv

*

i • mtei iniuiugiu, i uiiiAk bought a small piece

of cocaine and billowed it. i< I P 1 V 1 9 - 4 ^

!•» " i >' I

>^jtedsome

cocaine, so he gave Pollock money to buy more1 lu* > "ri" '

I'l

.1 v i i lock left the park looking for another cocaine source, Defc± uacu i

s

i. 11'"11

i < * \ \• ,ri v 11 s«i; >

.._igiiigoui .ii die area, began following Pollock and "harassing" h ^ , ^ cocaine.
' "'* "It I- 2 I .". "v 4i', 45-4^. r OIIOLK told Defendant, whom., he did not know, that
he did not li AW JII ," 1\ l"1"1 / I , t\\f l> /" tiiei J u i ti«i ig a dealer, i\ il lock bought a
" twenty" piece of cocaine and refn m« -1 h « t*

*l '( •

lk.

.<„.*.., .w, .,» Hi iat

down on a bench, bit off a piece of the cocaine for hi m ^ • i *

. • •« t!-.

m e n d Tony, ^ 170: 21,24,39-41,49-50.
Aggravated
Defen
24,45-46,50-51. A=>uv

Assault

.aiamg |rou«.K.kj ror some cocaine/' R 170 ~2,
*

- ,: i • K: .

. -picas,

, „. 1-22,24,

45, 50-51. ~ " _>ck left the bench, knelt on the -ro
tried to open a bottle of wine Tony had given him. R. 170:20-2^ \ "* - v> ~'• -~ "

2

Consistent with an appellate court's review of the record on appeal, the
State recites "the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict;" State
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,339 (Utah 1 997)
5

he did so, Pollock saw Defendant with a large knife raised over his head, poised
to attack him. R. 170:26,52,55. Pollock dropped everything, including the small
knife, stood up, raised both hands in self-defense, and yelled, "What's going on?"
R. 170:26-27,46-47,53,110. Defendant lunged at Pollock and stabbed him in the
stomach. R. 170: 27-28,53. Pollock fell to the ground and then tried to fend off
Defendant's further attacks, but to no avail. R. 170: 28. As Pollock, lay on the
ground, Defendant repeatedly stabbed Pollock—again in the stomach, in the
shoulder, and in the buttocks. R. 170:27-28,53-54. Pollock yelled, "I'm done." R.
170:28,53. Defendant responded, "I know you are," and walked away. R. 170:
28-29,53.
When the assault occurred, Gail Cameron was working the front desk
inside the Road Home. R. 170:61-62. She could view activity outside the shelter
on a monitor connected to an outside camera. R. 170:62-63,71. When Defendant
first assaulted Pollock, she was turned away from the monitor. See R. 170: 63.
However, she looked back in time to see Pollock "fall to the ground." R. 170: 63,
71-72. She then saw Pollock lying on his back, "with his hands and liis feet in the
air, as though he were trying to defend himself."See R. 170: 63-64, 71-72. Ms.
Cameron saw Defendant standing over Pollock. R. 170: 65-67. He appeared
angry and was postured to hit Pollock. R. 170:65-67. She then saw him "lean[ ]
over" and appear to slug Pollock two to three times, while Pollock "tr[ied] to
6

ward off the attack/' R. 170:66,75. "When Defendant stood up and stepped back,
Ms. Cameron saw that Defendant was holding a large knife. R. 170:66-67. "[I'Jor
iet second, [Defendant] just stood there with the knife in his hand/' R. 170:
, ^ una v\ aiKed east across the street," r^ippearing into a

Two women helped Pollorl* nil id i I he sheltei 1- 111 1,,li nn % ufi u{i On <
inside, Pollock began losing consciousness and the two women helpeu i imi.
floor. ~ "~~ 69-70. Meanwhile, Ms. Cameron telephoned 9-1-1. R. 170: 67-68.
er An j,

•i-~1 who wa s just around the v. orne r, arrived short] y aftei ~\
t i n * * .

03. Emereen'

<. • i * .

;cuical persorr >

i

s

-Itxf^iK

*

i j •

<.

"

-s

Defendant to 'the hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery. See R. 170:
30,70,103.
Defe • ";| i I i .• it's Arrest
Officers Mike Blarkbin n JIHI! Kevin l;ord rei- ponded to the scene in search
of the suspect, described as ,i ''inale BLirff ,nli«lt \v<\inn£ n hlnrk shirt .iiini 1 \ liiiiil
pants." R. 170: 77-78, 90-91, 97-98. They spotted Defendai it, w ho matched
suspect's description, across the street from the shelter, crouched down on a
sidewalk with a dark green duffle bag in. front of him. R. 170:78-80,83,85,91-93.
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When they approached Defendant, he was fidgeting with the duffle bag and "was
really nervous, real apprehensive to make eye contact." R. 170: 79-80, 91-92.
With the aid of a flashlight, Officer Ford peered inside Defendant's open duffle
bag and saw two knives; the blade of one was "poking up with blood running
down it." R. 170: 94-96,98,100,118-19,127; SE10.
At a showup in front of the shelter, Ms. Cameron identified Defendant as
the assailant and said "she was 100 percent sure." R. 170:105. Another woman
also identified Defendant as the assailant, but said she was "about 80 percent
sure." R. 170:105. Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station.
R. 170: 81-83,94,105-07.
Defendant's Interview with Police
In an interview room at the police station, Officer Portel placed a Miranda
waiver form on the table in front of Defendant and advised him of his Miranda
rights. Stip. %% 1-2. The following exchange then took place:
Officer Portel:

Do you understand these rights?

Defendant:

Yes. I'm being charged?

Officer Portel:

Urn, yes, you are under arrest.

Defendant:

For what?

Officer Portel:
Officer Portel:

For aggravated assault.
Now, if you would like to tell me your side of the story,
because, like I said, I'm kind of missing some of the
information I think, uh, I need you to sign this form
saying that you, you do want to talk to me, you, you do

8

W a n t t o hf; W

"Vfend*.v ;:

:!

c i «i u n - < i n ; , 11 i n n n j * h f ninnni i

I!

' -"i-rer Portel:

No,youd<Mi i IMV '

a lendant:

I won't (shaking hc> •

>jiiiccT Portel:

You're not goin^ ? —• •.

Defend; *:

]

Officer Portel:

So, you don't want to answer any questions right now?

Defendant:

Huh-uh (shaking head).

Officer Portel:

Okay.

Stip.fZ

ishaking heac ..

^ncerPortelthenfoldpit 1

r.r

her notebook. While putting her pen back
^ H Defendant that she needed to verify his name and . . .
ideiitificatioii. Stip. f 3. As she did so,. Lieutenant C.T. Smith "opened the door
.in.I .isked to speak willt limi

Hhcer Portel exitedJeaving Defendant alone in the

room/' ^HT
About a minute later, "I A. Smith mi] * Hlimr IWU'I re-enKied ihtji i

M IJJI

I f,

Smith explained to Defendant that he was 'possibly respon-lHi
sent a man to the hospital, but that they 'don't 1
(

the \\ hoL „ .3.

-v r

, -_. ^'.unMung mat LAiendant had been read his Miranda rights and that!

unders" ^ J *; **. /.<
arrest and not ^rc

. .;-. ,

f

ataith\
.

he was under
up. \^ i

told. Defendant that police had 'an indication' 1 Vl'rmlrinl "rrnijil h
for the crime, but that they 'don't know the other side of the stor
9

ne

• -,

<'
fold

Defendant that this was his opportunity to tell police his side of the story and 'get
it out there on public record/ if he wished to do so." Stip. % 8. Lt. Smith told
Defendant, however, that "he was not required to speak with police." Stip. % 8.
Lt. Smith then requested the Miranda waiver form from Officer Porte I and re-read
Defendant his rights. See Stip. J 9; see SE19 (00:00-00:32).
After Defendant confirmed that he understood his rights, Lt. Smith asked
him if he "want[ed] to tell [his] side of the story." SE19 (00:33-00:50). In response,
Defendant said that it was "basically... just a misunderstanding." SE19 (00:5100:56). Referring to the written waiver form, Defendant again asked whether he
had to sign it; Lt. Smith responded that he did not and that it was up to him.
SE19 (01:05-1:18). Defendant signed the waiver, as did Lt. Smith. SE19 (01:1802:19); Stip. <[9.
Defendant told the officers that "it was a fight." SE19 (02:41-02:45). When
Lt. Smith asked if he remembered what the fight started over, Defendant said,
"something stupid." SE19 (03:03-03:15). Officer Portel asked Defendant to
identify "what the stupid thing" was, because they "might not think it's so
stupid" if he told them. SE19 (03:17-03:31). Defendant responded that it was
about "being real stupid,... being in the wrong place at the wrong time and just
not . . . paying attention to . . . what's going around."

SE19 (03:45-04:02),,

Continuing, Defendant said, "you never know the situation. [Now] I have
10

problems." SE19 (04:08-04:17), Officer Portel told Defendant that he "must have
done something/' SE19 (04:53-05:06). Defendant responded, "It wasn't h[im], it
was me. I [got caught] up i n . . . drug thing

I use drugs and . . . [my mind]

go off." SE19 (05:07-05:36). When Officer Portel asked Defendant what kind of
drugs he used, Defendant said it was cocaine. SE19 (05:36-05:50).
Defendant's Trial Testimony
At trial, Defendant claimed that he stabbed Pollock in self-defense. See R.
170:117-28,131-32. He testifeid that Pollock, accompanied by a couple of other
men, accused him of stealing drugs the night before. R. 170:119. He denied any
knowledge of the stolen drugs and retreated to a bench near the shelter, hoping
Defendant and his friends would stop harassing him. R. 170:119-21. He testified
that about an hour later, they returned and Pollock sat down on the bench next to
him and resumed his accusations. R. 170:121-22. He claimed that Pollock then
attacked him with a knife. R. 170:122-23. He claimed that he grabbed one of two
knives from his duffle bag and used it to ward off Pollock's attacks. R. 170:119,
123. He testified that Pollock was swinging wildly and he was swinging back,
but did not realize that he had inflicted any injury. R. 170:123-26.
Defendant claimed that during the fight, Pollock "fell on the ground and
thr[ew] his hands up, saying, "I'm done." R. 170:124,130-32. Defendant asserted
that when he saw that Pollock no longer had the knife, he quit and walked away.

11

R. 170:124-26,130-32. Defendant denied assaulting Pollock after Pollock fell to
the ground. R. 170:131.
Defendant further testified that at the police station, officers "asked [him] a
lot of questions" and that he told them that he "d[id]n't want to answer no more
questions" and that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. R. 170:127. Defendant
explained that when he told the officers the altercation started because of a
"misunderstanding," he was speaking of Pollock's accusation that Defendant
stole the drugs. R. 170:127-28. He explained that he was referring to the drug
dispute when he told police that the altercation was over something "stupid." R.
170:128. Finally, he explained that when he said, "It wasn't him; it was me," he
was admitting that he had in fact stolen drugs from Pollock the night before. R.
170:128.

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Waiver of Miranda Claim. Under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence at least five days
before trial operates as a waiver of that claim, unless cause is shown justifying
relief from that waiver. Because Defendant did not file his motion to suppress
until the morning of trial, and offered no cause justifying relief from waiver of his
Miranda claim, the district court properly deemed it waived. For the first time on
appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in not excusing
the late filing, because the prosecutor suffered no prejudice and he suffered great
prejudice. This Court should not consider these claims, because Defendant failed
to preserve them by raising them below. In any event, the prosecutor was
prejudiced by the late filing. He had no opportunity to review Defendant's
allegations against the recording of the interview, nor was he able to research the
applicable law. Moreover, prejudice suffered by a defendant who is dilatory in
filing a motion to suppress is not sufficient to excuse the late filing.
In the alternative, Defendant argues that the trial court in fact ruled on the
merits. The court, however, made clear that its denial was based on Defendant's
failure to comply with rule 12. In commenting on the merits, the court made clear
that it was speaking hypothetically and simply for the edification of counsel.

13

Defendant also argues that his failure to comply with the filing
requirements of rule 12 cannot be the basis for the denial of a constitutional
challenge. This argument lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that the right to raise a constitutional claim may be limited by rule.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant argues that even if his
Miranda claim was waived, his conviction should be reversed because his trial
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not timely filing the motion to
suppress. To prevail, Defendant must demonstrate that: (1) his trial counsel was
deficient in faffing to file a nrnefy motion to suppress, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. The St^te concedes that Defendant has
satisfied the first prong.

Defendant invoked his right to remain silent.

Accordingly, had a timely motion been filed, Defendant's subsequent statements
would have been suppressed. However, Defendant has not demonstrated that
thos^ statements prejudiced him. The testimony of Ms. Cameron substantially
corroborated the victim's claim that Defendant repeatedly assaulted him with a
knif^. The severity of the injuries suffered by the victim, in stark contrast to the
lack of any injury to Defendant, also renders admission of Defendant's statement
harmless. In short, there is no reasonable probability of a different verdict had
Defendant's statement been suppressed.

14

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS MIRANDA CLAIM WHEN HE
FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND DID
NOT OFFER ANY CAUSE EXCUSING THE UNTIMELY FILING
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that motions to
suppress evidence "be raised at least five days prior to the trial/7 Utah R. Crim. P.
12(c). The rule also provides that failure to comply with this requirement "shall
constitute waiver thereof/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). Relying on this rule, the trial
court concluded that Defendant "waived77 his Miranda claim because he did not
file his motion until the morning of trial. See R. 100-01; R. 170: 7, 13-14. On
appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in treating his
untimely motion as waived. Aplt. Brf. at 21-26. His argument lacks merit.
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim that he was entitled to relief
from the waiver of his Miranda challenge on timeliness grounds.
Defendant argues that under the plain language of rule 12, the trial court
"has considerable discretion77 to grant relief to a defendant who fails to comply
with rule 127s five-day filing requirement. Aplt. Brf. at 22,24. That much is true.
Under rule 12, "the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver."
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). On appeal, Defendant advances two reasons why the
district court abused its discretion in not granting relief: (1) "the prosecution
never claimed any prejudice caused by77 the late filing, but was prepared to argue

15

the merits of the motion, Aplt. Brf. at 22-23, 26; and (2) the "potential for
prejudice" to Defendant was too great, given the constitutional nature of his
claim, Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. Defendant, however, did not make these arguments to
the trial court. Because Defendant failed to preserve them below, the Court
should not address them now.
The law is well settled that "to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant
must raise the issue before the district court in such a way that the court is placed
on notice of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or avoid the
error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, \ 10, 189 P.3d 85. When a
defendant fails to do so, this Court will not consider it on appeal. See State v.
Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13,95 P.3d 276 (holding that appellate court will not address
unpreserved claim absent a showing of plain error or exceptional circumstances).
After the prosecutor objected to the motion as untimely, Defendant did not
argue, as "cause" for relief from waiver, that going forward would work no
prejudice to the prosecution or that it would unfairly prejudice his own defense.
Indeed, counsel for Defendant did not address the State's timeliness objection at
all; she ignored it. See R. 170:10-13. Instead, she reiterated her argument on the
3

Defendant has not argued either plain error or exceptional circumstances
on appeal, and therefore, this Court should not address them either. See Monson
v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1022 (Utah 1996) (refusing to address unpreserved claim
where defendant "has not attempted to demonstrate the applicability of either
exception" to the preservation rule).
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merits of the motion. See R. 170:10-13. Defendant, therefore, failed to preserve
his claims that his late filing should have been excused.
Because Defendant failed to preserve these claims at trial, and has not
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances, he has "waived the right to
assert" them on appeal. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, J 2,122 P.3d 566 (holding
that defendant "waived the right to assert his challenge" on appeal "[bjecause
[he] failed to preserve this issue below and failed to argue plain error in his
opening brief"). It cannot be said that a trial court abused its discretion in not
excusing an untimely motion to suppress where, as here, Defendant offered no
cause to justify relief.
B. In any event, Defendant was not entitled to relief from the waiver
of his Miranda challenge on timeliness grounds.
In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated that he was entitled to relief
from the waiver of his Miranda challenge on timeliness grounds.
1. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the prosecution was
not prejudiced by the untimeliness of his motion to suppress.
Defendant argues that because the prosecutor was able to argue the merits
of the Miranda challenge, he was entitled to relief from the waiver rule. See Aplt.
Brf. at 22-23. He contends that the prosecutor "never claimed any prejudice
caused by a lack of notice," but instead "indicated to the court that he was
prepared to argue the motion on its merits and he then proceeded to do so."
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Aplt Brf. at 22-23. This claim misconstrues the prosecution's response and
ignores the record facts.
After the district court learned that the prosecution intended to include in
its opening statement some of Defendant's statements to police, it asked the
prosecutor whether he was prepared to address the motion to suppress "at this
time, recognizing that it was just served . . . this morning." R. 170: 6-7. The
prosecutor responded, "Yes." R. 170: 7. While at first blush the prosecutor's
response suggested that he would not object based on timeliness grounds, the
record demonstrates otherwise. See 17-18. After defense counsel argued the
motion, R. 170: 7-10, the prosecutor argued as follows:
First of all, prior to going into the merits of this I want to make an
objection based on timeliness. The Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly state that a motion to suppress needs to be brought five
days prior to trial; and this is only the morning of trial. Beyond that,
I could offer to the Court a photocopy of the signed Miranda waiver
that is signed by the defendant and also the officer who conducted
the interview.
R. 170: 10. Thus, the prosecutor's first and primary response was an objection
based on imtimeliness. Only after making this objection did the prosecutor
briefly turn to the merits. R. 170:10.
Although the prosecutor ultimately addressed the merits, any competent
litigator would have done the same. And contrary to Defendant's claim on
appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 23, the prosecutor's response did not suggest that he was
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fully prepared to address the merits. Quite the contrary. When defense counsel
countered that Defendant had invoked his right to remain silent before signing
the waiver form, the prosecutor complained that he " d i d n ' t know exactly how
accurate th[e] transcript is." R. 170:11. Then, drawing from memory, he argued
that Defendant's response to Officer Portel's query as to whether he wished to
speak with police was "ambiguous." R. 170:11 (stating that Defendant "ma[de]
some ambiguous noises, 'uh-huh/ or 'uh-uh'").
After Defendant appealed and filed his brief, the State received a copy of
the recording, reviewed it, and stipulated that "Defendant unequivocally
responded [to Officer Portel] that he did not want to waive his rights and speak
with police." Stip. *j[ 10. Had the prosecutor been afforded a similar opportunity,
as required under rule 12, he most certainly would have reached the same
conclusion reached by the State on appeal. And in that case, he would have
prepared his case for trial differently. But he was not afforded that opportunity
and was forced to argue the motion based on his recollection of the recording. In
sum, the untimely filing by Defendant amounted to an ambush, thereby denying
the prosecution the opportunity to investigate both the facts and the relevant law,
and then prepare for trial accordingly. In other words, he was prejudiced by the
late filing.
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2. Any prejudice suffered by a defendant as a result of his own
dilatory filing does not compel the trial court to grant relief
from the defendant's waiver.
Relying on State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215,138 P.3d 97, Defendant argues
that the district court's refusal to address his motion to suppress was also
improper because he suffered prejudice as a result of that refusal. See Aplt. Brf. at
23-24. Cornejo, however, sets forth the standard against which motions to continue
are judged. It does not suggest that a dilatory filing of a motion to suppress
evidence may be excused simply because the defendant would otherwise be
prejudiced. Indeed, Cornejo stands for the opposite proposition.
Like Defendant in this case, Cornejo filed a motion to suppress evidence
(blood sample from warrantless draw) on the day of trial. Cornejo, 2006 UT App
215, \ 4. The prosecutor objected to the motion because it was untimely under
rule 12. Id. at \ 5. The trial court overruled the prosecutor's objection and
ordered an immediate evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury. Id.
Missing a witness needed to address the motion, the prosecutor moved for a
continuance. Id. at \ 6. The trial court denied the motion to continue and
dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at YSL 7-10. In denying the continuance, the
court reasoned that "the State had wrongfully assumed that [Comedo's] failure to»
file a motion to suppress at least five days before trial meant that [Cornejo] could
not simply object to the introduction of the evidence at trial." Id. at % 7. The court
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ruled that notwithstanding an untimely motion, the State must be prepared to
proceed with its evidence "and have a legal basis for that to come in." Id.
This Court reversed, holding that the denial of the State's request for a
continuance "was 'an unreasonable action/" Id. at % 23 (citation omitted). Id. at %
36. In so holding, the Court followed the four-step inquiry for continuances
established in State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982):
[W]hen a party to a criminal action "moves for a continuance in
order to procure the testimony of an absent witness," the party must
demonstrate that: (1) "the testimony sought is material and
admissible," (2) "the witness could actually be produced," (3) "the
witness could be produced within a reasonable time," and (4) "due
diligence ha[d] been exercised before the request for a continuance."
Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, \ 15 (quoting Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752). The Court
concluded that the first Creviston factor of materiality was satisfied because the
absent officer's testimony was necessary to establish that a warrantless blood
draw was necessary. Id. at W 16-17. It concluded that the second and third
Creviston factors were satisfied because, as an employee of the Utah Highway
Patrol, the absent witness '"could actually [have] be[en] produced . . . within a
reasonable time.'" Id. at f 18 (citation omitted). And finally, it concluded that the
fourth Creviston factor of due diligence was met because "the State accurately
read rule 12 to require that Defendant timely file a motion to suppress and that
his failure to do so waived any future ability to contest the admissibility of the
blood sample." Id. at \ 22.
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In summary, Cornejo articulates the standard for determining whether or
not to grant a motion to continue, not whether or not to grant relief from the
waiver consequences of an untimely motion to suppress. However, in applying
that standard, Cornejo reaffirmed that untimely motions to suppress are "waived"
under rule 12. Id. Therefore, far from undermining the district court's decision
below, Creviston supports it.
Even if the Creviston standard applied to a defendant's request for relief
from waiver, Defendant wholly ignores the fourth Creviston requirement: the
moving party must demonstrate that he or she exercised "due diligence" before
the request for relief. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, % 15. Defendant made no such
attempt below, nor has he on appeal.
C. In commenting that it would have denied the motion to suppress
had it reached the merits, the trial court did not purport to decide
the motion on its merits.
In the alternative, Defendant argues that the trial court issued a
"subsequent cursory denial of the motion [to suppress] purportedly on its
merits/' Aplt. Brf. at 22. A review of the judge's remarks, however, discounts
Defendant's claim. After the judge "denied" the motion to suppress, "on the basis
of the timeliness issue," he opined as to how he would have ruled had the claim
not been waived: "if I were addressing the merits, if it were me, here's how I
would have done it, I would rule that the motion ought to be denied." R. 170:14

M

(emphasis added). Moreover, he prefaced these comments by specifically
indicating that they were "for edification of the Counsel." R. 170:14. In other
words, the judge did not purport to rule on the merits, as Defendant contends on
appeal.
In summary, the basis of the trial court's ruling was that Defendant waived
his Miranda claim when he failed to timely file the motion to suppress. Because
the court treated the untimely filing as a waiver, Defendant's Miranda claim was
not preserved and he may not challenge it on appeal. The trial court's subsequent
comments were advisory only. They "d[id] not embody the resolution or
determination of the court" and were thus mere dicta. Black's Law Dictionary
236 (5th ed. 1983).
In support of his claim, Defendant cites State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048
(Utah 1991). Aplt. Brf. at 25 (quoting R. 170: 14). That case, however, is
inapposite.
At the beginning of trial in Matsamas, defense counsel moved the trial court
to make certain reliability findings, as required by statute, before allowing
hearsay statements of a child abuse victim. Matsamas, 808 P.2d at 1052. The trial
court ruled that it would not address the admissibility of any testimony until it
was before the court during trial. Id. When the prosecutor tried to elicit the
hearsay at trial, defense counsel objected, arguing that it could be admitted only
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after the trial court made the required reliability findings. Id. The trial court
overruled the objection, concluding that the testimony would help both the court
and jury in deciding what had occurred. Id.
On appeal, the State acknowledged that the trial court did not make the
necessary reliability findings. Id. However, for the first time on appeal, the State
argued that under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Matsamas waived
his right to raise that issue on appeal "because defense counsel did not object to
the testimony until trial/7 Id. This Court rejected the State's waiver argument. Id.
at 1053. The Court held that because the trial court "chose not to treat
defendant's failure to [timely] raise the issue . . . as a waiver," but instead
"proceeded to consider the claim," the trial court "effectively waived the
requirements of rule 12." Id. The Court thus held that "the objection was
preserved for appeal." Id.
Unlike Matsamas, the prosecutor in this case objected at trial to the motion
to suppress on timeliness grounds. And unlike Matsamas, the trial court below
treated Defendant's failure to timely file his motion to suppress as a waiver. See
R. 170:13-14. As explained above, the trial court below spoke hypothetically and
specifically stated that its remarks were for the edification of counsel. In other
words, unlike the case in Matsamas, the court's remarks were never meant to be a
binding ruling on the merits.
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D. The right to raise a constitutional claim may properly be regulated
by procedural rule.
Finally, Defendant argues that a trial court may not deny, on procedural
grounds, an untimely motion to suppress evidence that alleges a constitutional
violation. See Aplt Brf. at 25-26. But the cases cited by Defendant are inapposite.
Indeed, they do not even purport to address the effect of an untimely or
unpreserved constitutional claim. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)
(issue of whether challenge was timely or otherwise preserved not raised or
addressed); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (same); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (same); Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538,543-44 (1967) (same).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant has a
"constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of a
confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination" of the issue by
the trial court. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964) (emphasis added).
The Court has held, however, that the right to assert constitutional claims is "not
available indefinitely and without limitation. Procedural barriers, such as
statutes of limitation and rules concerning procedural default and exhaustion of
remedies, operate to limit access to review on the merits of a constitutional
claim." Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001); accord Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) ("[I]t has long been accepted that the waiver of
constitutional rights can be subjected to reasonable procedural regulations.").
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The high Court has thus repeatedly recognized that "'a constitutional right/ or a
right of any other sort, 'may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine i t ' " United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (quoting Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414,444 (1944)) (emphasis added); accord Daniels, 532 U.S.
at 381. Such was the case here.
II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT FILING A TIMELY MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
STATEMENTS
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
failing to timely file the motion to suppress his statement to police. Aplt. Brf. at
15-20. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,689
(1984). He must demonstrate that (1) "counsel's performance was deficient/' and
(2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. Ineffective
assistance of counsel will not be found unless the defendant "makes both
showings." Id. In this case, Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the
Strickland test. However, he has not satisfied the second prong. Therefore, his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
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A. The State concedes that trial counsel was deficient because a
timely motion to suppress would have resulted in the exclusion of
Defendant's statement to police.
Because Defendant's ineffectiveness claim rests on his counsel's failure to
timely file the motion to suppress alleging a Miranda violation, the Court "must
first decide whether defendant's Miranda rights were actually violated," State v.
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993); accord State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, \
12,163 P.3d 647. If they were not, counsel cannot be said to have performed
deficiently in failing to raise a motion that would have failed. See State v. PerezAvila, 2006 UT App 71, \ 7,131 P.2d 864 (holding that "counsel's performance at
trial is not deficient if counsel refrains from making futile objections, motions, or
requests").
Under Miranda v. Arizona, police may not question a suspect in custody
unless they first inform him that "he has the right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966). "After an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights and has
determined that the suspect understands those rights, the officer must then
determine if the suspect is willing to waive those rights and answer questions."
State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1997). If the suspect invokes his right to
remain silent, questioning must cease; if he requests coimsel, questioning must

27

cease "until an attorney is present." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. If, on the other
hand, the suspect voluntarily waives his rights "after receiving the Miranda
warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him." Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452,458 (1994).
In this case, Defendant invoked his right to remain silent. After he was
taken to the police station, Officer Portel read Defendant his Miranda rights. Stip.
12. She then told him that he would need to sign the waiver form if he wished to
speak with her. Id. When Defendant asked whether he had to sign it, Officer
Portel told him no. Id. Defendant then shook his head and replied,"] won't." Id.
After re-coniirming that Defendant did not want to sign the waiver form, Officer
Portel asked, "So, you don't want to answer any questions right now?" Id. Again
shaking his head, Defendant replied, "Huh-uh." Id. The State concedes that
Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent at that time. See Stip.
110.
Where Defendant invoked his right to remain silent, police were required
to cease further questioning. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-44. Because they did
not, see SE19, Defendant's subsequent statement to police would have been
excluded had trial counsel moved for their suppression within the time limits of
rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id. As in Snyder, the record here
reveals "no legitimate trial tactic to be served by [counsel's failure] to comply
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with [rule 12's] filing requirement." 860 P.2d at 359. Accordingly, "in failing to
timely file the motion to suppress, counsel's performance was objectively
deficient." Id.
B. Where the evidence against Defendant was overwhelming, the
improper admission of his statements to police was not
prejudicial.
Although Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test, to
prevail he must also demonstrate that "the deficient performance prejudiced [his]
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy this prong, Defendant "must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [the failure of counsel to
timely move for suppression], the [jury verdict] would have been different." Id.
at 694; accord Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359. As explained in Strickland, "[a] reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
466 U.S. at 694; accord Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359. Defendant has not satisfied this
prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, his claim must fail.
Defendant argues that his admissions to police were "absolutely critical"
because both he and Pollock had "serious credibility issues" and Gail Cameron,
the disinterested witness, "saw only the last portion of the fight." Aplt. Brf. at 20,
19. He contends that absent his statement to police, "there is a reasonable
probability the jury would have acquitted him." Aplt. Brf. at 20. This contention
ignores the overwhelming evidence against Defendant.
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Pollock claimed that Defendant stabbed him because Pollock refused to
give him any cocaine. Defendant claimed that Pollock stabbed him because
Defendant stole drugs from him. Had this been the only evidence, admission of
Defendant's statements would have been problematic.

But contrary to

Defendant's argument on appeal, Gail Cameron's testimony was more than
sufficient to dispel any doubt that Defendant assaulted Pollock.
Gail Cameron was a disinterested witness who viewed most of the
altercation on a monitor at the front desk inside the homeless shelter. See R. 170:
61-67,71-72. Although she did not see the initial exchange, she saw Defendant
fall to the ground on his back. R. 170: 63, 71-72. She testified that she then saw
Pollock lying "on his back, with his hands and his feet in the air, as though he
were trying to defend himself." R. 170: 63-64, 71-72. She then saw Defendant
standing over Pollock and testified that he appeared angry and poised to hit
Pollock. R. 170: 65-66. She testified that Defendant then leaned over and
appeared to slug Pollock two or three times, but that after Defendant stopped and
stood up, she saw that he was holding a knife with a 3-5 inch blade. R. 170:66-67,
75.
The foregoing testimony strongly corroborated Pollock's testimony that
after he fell to the ground, Defendant stabbed him again in the stomach, in the
shoulder, and in the buttocks.

R. 170: 27-28, 53-54. Her testimony also
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corroborated Pollock's claim that he was only trying to defend himself with his
hands and feet during this exchange. See R. 170:66,75. Defendant discounts Ms.
Cameron's testimony because "[s]he was not watching the monitor when the
fight started, so she did not see who initiated the attack." Aplt. Brf. at 19.
However, even if Pollock had instigated the fight, all three who testified—
Pollock, Cameron, and Defendant—agreed that after Pollock fell to the ground,
he was not posing a threat to Defendant. See R. 170: 26-27, 46-47, 53, 110
(Pollock's testimony); R. 170:63-64,66,75 (Cameron's testimony); R. 170:124-26,
130-32 (Defendant's testimony). Thus, even if Defendant had initially acted in
self-defense, he clearly was not doing so after Pollock fell to the ground. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (West 2004) (self-defense statute). Where there was no
legitimate self-defense claim after Pollock's fall, Ms. Cameron's testimony
corroborated the subsequent aggravated assault.
Pollock's extensive injuries also belie Defendant's claim of self-defense.
Whereas Defendant received no injuries, the injuries suffered by Pollock were
extensive and perhaps life-threatening if not treated. Surgeons removed 12
inches of his large intestine. R. 170: 30. He suffered a laceration to his colon,
which required the insertion of a colostomy bag. R. 170:30. He suffered a large
laceration across his shoulder, which was stapled together during surgery. R.
170:30. Pollock was in the hospital five to eight weeks before being released. R.
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170: 31. Pollock wore the colostomy bag for another month or so and had a
second surgery to remove the bag and "put back together" his colon. R. 170:32.
In the process, Pollock lost 50 pounds and suffered other digestive difficulties. R.
170:33-34.4
In light of the foregoing corroborating evidence, no "reasonable probability
exists that the jury's verdict would have been more favorable to defendant had
the information from the interview been suppressed." Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359.
Accordingly, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails in any event.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted February 2,2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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,

-"Assistant Attorney Gene^l
Counsel for Appellee

4

It should also be noted that Defendant's statement to police was not a full
blown confession. While it was certainly susceptible to being interpreted as an
admission, as argued by the prosecutor, it was also susceptible to being
interpreted as referring only to the drug dispute, as claimed by Defendant and
argued by his counsel. See R. 170:127-28.
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ADDENDUM

U.S. Const, amend. V
. . . nor shall any person... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself

U.S. Const, amend. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Utah R. Crim. P. 12
* * *

(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection
or request, including request for rulings on the admissibility of
evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial of the
general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion.
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to
the trial:
***

(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence;
***

(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial
unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for
later determination. Where factual issues are involved in
determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or
at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the
court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
***

